D R. ROBERT L. FINE. Professor
Thomas Mayo is Jommg me today to talk about treatment for the dymg patient: medical ethics and the law. Tom is an associate professor of law at Southern Methodist University and a scholar m health law and b10ethics. He also is an ad1unct professor m the Department of Internal Medicme at The University of Texas Southwestern Medical School Tom serves on numerous ethics committees m North Texas. He cochairs the ethics committee of Parkland Memorial Hospital and has served on our own ethics committee for years. He is a wise teacher and scholar and is well known for his expertise m health law and medical ethics.
When Professor Mayo and I first discussed physician-assisted smcide and euthanasia as part of the spectrum Thomas w Mayo, JD of treatment alternatives for dymg patients, we did not know how timely the topic would become. Recently, the first 2 cases oflegally sanctioned physician-assisted smcide were reported m Oregon Meanwhile, a rogue respiratory therapist at a California hospital confessed to killmg dozens of his patients whom he deemed to be deservmg of some type of active euthanasia Of course, Dr Jack Kevorkian has either killed or assisted m the deaths of> 100 patients.
I want to start by walkmg you through the poem titled "How Annandale Went Out" ( 1) , written around the turn of the century by the Pulitzer Pnze-wmnmg American poet Edwm Arlmgton Robmson . Annandale is a character who appears m several of Robmson's wrinngs In this poem, the speaker, m fact, is a physician.
They called it Annandale-and I was there To flourish, to fmd words, and to attend Liar, physician, hypocrite, and fnend, I watched him, and the sight was not so fair BUMC PR6CEEDINGS 1998, As one or two that I have seen elsewhere An apparatus not for me to mend-A wreck, with hell between him and the end, remamed of Annandale, and I was there I knew the rum as I knew the man, So put the two together, if you can, Remembenng the worst you know of me Now, view yourself as I was, on the spot-W 1th a slight kmd of engme Do you see 7 
Like this
You wouldn't hang me? I thought not
In the first stanza, the physician is very honest about what we physicians sometimes are-sometimes liars, sometimes hypocrites, and sometimes fnends to our patients The physician is seemg a patient whom he refers to as an "it," as an "apparatus," as a "wreck," with hell between now and the death to come. Unlike Jack Kevorkian, this physician is saymg, "I knew this man when he was well, and I know what he is now" The physician's only weapon agamst Annandale's impendmg h~llish road to death is a "slight kmd of engme"-the cylmder and piston of a syrmge When we get to the end of the poem, the physician has euthanized or killed the patient I would like to put you on the spot and ask how many are willing to hang this physician for his act10ns? Perhaps hangmg is too strong a punishment. How many would at least condemn the physician and say that you are troubled with what he did? The mdecision about both the propriety and punishment, if only for the actions described m this poem, reflects our long-standmg ambivalence about the alternative of active euthanasia for the dymg patient And yet, active euthanasia is only one alternative of several we shall explore.
So, what, then, are the options for the dymg patient and the physician, nurse, or chaplam "on the spot" with the patient 7 Obv10usly, the first is contmued aggressive treatment-what I like to refer to as medical practice by technologic imperative: "I dialyze, therefore, I am." Medical practice by technologic imperative follows the witticism, "To the person who owns a hammer, everything looks like a nail "You Just keep pushmg the technology at the patient, even when it is no longer beneficial or constructive.-Thankfully, I thmk m American medicme right now we have evolved to a pomt where most recognize that there are lim-its to technology. As powerful and seemingly muaculous as it may often be, there comes a point where continuing aggressive treatment is no longer in the best interest of the dying patient. We are relearning to practice with what I call the ethical and the spmtual imperative. We ask not only what can be done technically, but what should be done. By asking the question, we enter an ethical and even a spmtual dimension of healing, and we find that there are 4 basic opt10ns that are practiced in this country: passive euthanasia, induect euthanasia, physician-assisted smcide, and active euthanasia. There remams considerable misunderstanding about these terms; the following are the standard defmitions denved from the ethics literature.
Passive euthanasia is terminating or withholding life-sustaining treatment, thereby allowing the patient to die This is the most traditional way that physicians allow patients to die. It dates back to the Hippocratic tradition 2500 years ago when those physicians recognized that there were times when everything was not possible in medicme, and it was time to withdraw treatment and let nature take its course If you realize that 80% of the deaths m America occur in health care institutions of some sort, most of them hospitals, and that 80% of those deaths are preceded by consctous dec1S1ons either to withhold or withdraw medical therapy, you realize how common passive euthanasia has become.
The second opt10n is the practice of indirect euthanasia This is the administering of narcotics or other pharmaceuticals to relieve pain, dyspnea, nausea, or other symptoms of dying with the unintended or incidental consequence of death
The thud option is physician-assisted suicide. This is the option that has been adopted in the state of Oregon Physicianassisted smcide occurs when the physician provides medicat10ns or other intervent10ns with the understanding that the patient intends to use those medications to commit smcide In other words, it is not subtle; it 1s open and aboveboard. The doctor who prescnbes the medication knows exactly what is going to be done with it. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this is the oncologist Dr. Timothy Qmll.
Finally, there is active euthanasia-intentionally administering medications or other mtervent10ns to cause the patient's death, which is what is going on in the Annandale poem. We know that active euthanasia is not Just practiced by fictional physicians but occurs, at least on occas10n, m real life as well.
Passive euthanasia and induect euthanasia have become the standards of practice, for better or worse, in our country when it comes to acknowledging that a patient is going to die and decidmg how that is going to occur.
Despite this, there are obvious times when, at least in some people's minds, passive euthanasia and induect euthanasia are not optimal or best treatments Clearly, the citizens of the state of Oregon hold this belief. Interestingly, at least a couple of Junes who sat in Judgment over Dr Jack Kevorkian believe that passive and induect euthanasia are not optimal treatments and have refused to condemn him for engaging in active euthanasia
We are going to explore the alternatives of physician-assisted smcide and active euthanasia in a little more depth. They are obv10usly not identical, but in both cases the physician intends to kill or aid in the killing of a patient who could otherwise be kept alive I will cover the ethical arguments about these, and Professor Mayo will cover some of the legal issues But fust, let me give you some of the histoncal background.
The ethics of active euthanasia have been debated throughout medical history. In Hippocratic times, active euthanasia was practiced in ancient Greece. The Hippocratic physicians who refused to give a "deadly potion" were actually taking a minority view Histoncally, this became the maJonty view of medicine, yet not without continuous debate.
Str Thomas More (1478-1535) and Su Francis Bacon (1561-1626), to name only 2 important Western philosophers, believed that active euthanasia was appropnate for physioans to engage m. Similarly, about 4 centunes later m the USA, there was a bill m the Oh10 legislature to legalize active euthanasia. The bill was defeated, but the debate did occur To bnng us upto-date, m 1997 Oregon passed a bill that officially approved physician-assisted smcide. This bill resembles some of the rules that are m place in the Netherlands pertammg to active euthanasia.
The ethical arguments, either for or agamst physicianassisted smcide and active euthanasia, center around autonomy, beneficence, intent and actwn, and public policy concerns. Autonomy is a key concern m our society It is the notion that each of us ought to be self-governing, we ought to have control over ourselves Proponents of active euthanasia argue that the nght to self-governance is absolute and must include the ultimate autonomous act of choosing when and how to die. Around the turn of the century, Eugene Debbs, the social philosopher and labor organizer, stated, "Human life is sacred, but only to the extent that it contnbutes to the JOY and happmess of the one possessmg 1t and to those about him, and 1t ought to be the pnvilege of every human being to cross the River Styx in the boat ofh1s own choosmg when further human agony cannot be Justified by the hope offuture health and happiness." (2) Opponents argue that not all voluntary acts are Justified by autonomy. John Stuart Mill said, "1t 1s not freedom to be able to alienate his freedom " (3) That is, autonomy does not grant one the freedom to give away that freedom Furthermore, as a society we limit many voluntary acts, including dueling or the voluntary selling of oneself into slavery. Opponents of unlimited autonomy suggest 1t 1s not absolute, that we belong either to God or community Arguments about physician-assisted smcide also center on the concept of beneficence There 1s the idea that in the practice of med1cme we go to the house of the sick for the benefit of the sick. We are there to do good. Proponents of active euthanasia say that, in the face of unmitigated suffenng, the most beneficent act is to kill the patient. A duty to practice beneficently, then, can become a duty to kill the suffenng patient As I have looked back through medtcal histones, perhaps the best example that I have found of the notion of beneficence fulfilled through killing is m the wntmgs of Dr. Adma BladySzwaJgier m the Warsaw Children's Hospital Dr. SzwaJgier was a Viennese-trained pediatncian who completed her residency around 1939. She was picked up by the NaztS and confined to the Warsaw ghetto where she proceeded to establish and run the children's hospital. As you can imagine, they had very little medicine, and penodically Jews were taken out and sent to the killing camps.
Late m the war, the remammg Jews m the ghetto revolted agamst the Nazis and killed several German soldiers At that pomt, the Nazis came mto the ghetto and began shooting and executmg every Jewish person they could fmd. Dr Szwaigier had already seen German soldiers kill Jewish children by banging their heads agamst a wall m order to save bullets As the Nazis approached the hospital, she admmistered sedatives and pam killers she had hoarded and actively euthamzed the children on her wards She actually managed to survive but did not publish her memoir I Remember Nothing More until she was nearly 80 years old (4) . She clearly felt that the unmitigated suffering of her patients demanded somethmg that made her mtensely uncomfortable, the killmg of her patients. On readmg her memoir, I felt that she was actmg out of a sense of love for her patients, and that, m tellmg her story many years later, she was still showmg love for her patients Opponents of beneficence do not accept this argument. They say that the most beneficent act m the face of suffermg 1s, m fact, good palliative care The rare cases of unm1t1gated suffering do not Justify changmg medtcme's historic rules They basically appeal back to the H1ppocrat1c trad1t1on of refusmg to give a deadly potion.
Another ethical argument focuses on intent and action Proponents of active euthanasia and physician-assisted smcide argue that mtent and action are ummportant. They say that 1f passive euthanasia 1s acceptable, then active euthanasia also must be acceptable, because the end results that count are that the patient is dead and that the patient could not have been kept alive m either case These proponents go on to argue that 1t 1s d1smgenuous for those m support of only passive euthanasia or mduect euthanasia to say that they do not mtend for the patient to die when they withdraw treatment or engage m aggressive symptom control to the pomt of terminal sedation Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass1sted smCide state that the end results are not nearly as important morally as are mtent and action For example, m our society we draw a d1stmction between mvoluntary manslaughter and mtentional murder. In both of these cases, obviously the person has died, but the mtent was different. When we talk about passive euthanasia and physician-assisted smc1de, the mtent of passive euthanasia is said to be to relieve suffering by allowmg nature to take its course, not to kill the patient. The action engaged m is the withdrawal of treatment that rs not really prolonging life so much as prolongmg dymg. Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1c1an-assisted smc1de who favor passive and mdirect euthanasia argue that when they practice mdirect euthanasia, their mtent 1s to relieve suffermg by the act of g1vmg only enough medication to relieve that suffermg. I can guarantee you that a lot of you who have stood at the bedside of a dymg patient, nurses m particular man mtens1ve care umt settmg, have wrestled with this, thmkmg, "Well, I've got this order for morphme. How much can I give to relieve suffering and yet not engage actively m killmg my patient 7 " It does put nurses, particularly, man awkward spot Fmally, there are the public policy debates about euthanasia Proponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass-1sted smc1de argue that euthanasia happens already but man unregulated fashion There are certam polls suggesting that physicians do, on rare occasions, engage m this process I know that members of the Dallas medical commumty have, because we have discussed 1t privately. Proponents argue that it 1s bad for society to erect false barriers to a practice that 1s tolerated or endorsed by so many members of the soCiety Furthermore, proponents of active euthanasia and physicianassisted smc1de state that by makmg these act1v1ties legally available, patients will be protected by careful regulation of the practice. This 1s one of the arguments made m Oregon that I thmk helped carry that statute through the legislature. They go on to state that patients who might refuse to embark upon certam aggressive treatments for fear of bemg trapped by the treatment would now know that they have this legal right to engage m active euthanasia or phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de. Moreover, they would have the ability to end their lives qmckly and easily 1f thmgs did not turn out the way they wanted. Proponents argue that 1f active euthanasia or phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de were legally available, 1t would empower patients to accept more aggressive treatments than they currently accept Opponents obviously disagree with everythmg that I have Just said Basically, the public policy opposltlon to active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass1sted smcide falls mto what may be called the slippery slope factor That ts, 1f you go over the edge Just a little bit, you are gomg to slide right down the mountam. In 1920, Hoche and Bmdmg published The Permission to Kill Life Unworthy of Life ("lebens unwertes Leben") (5). Itwas widely subscribed to by most of orgamzed German med1cme, and rt convinced the maJority of German phys1c1ans that there were some human condmons that were so bad, the suffermg was so horrible, the disease was so d1sf1gurmg, or 1t caused the patient to be so far beneath what was considered to be human, that 1t was okay to kill the patient I German physicians and nurses actually murdered several hundred thousand retarded, deformed, demented, and chromcally 111 Aryan c1t1zens before they began ktllmg Jews who were seen as socially defective.
Opponents of phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia who look at the Dutch experience fmd little hope that the Dutch will behave better than the Germans The Netherlands has tolerated active euthanasia, the mtentional admimstrat10n of a drug by the physician to kill patients, for qmte a few years now as long as physicians followed certam safeguards. The safeguards are that the patient has to request active euthanasia repeatedly, the patient has to have unmitigated suffermg that cannot be relieved by any other means, and there has to be a second opm1on that agrees with the act.
To fmd out how well this was bemg practiced, the Dutch government set up a comm1ss10n under their attorney general, Remelmk (6) . This comm1ss10n conducted a prospective study by 405 Dutch physicians who reviewed 5197 deaths. They showed that, on average, there were about 9000 requests for active euthanasia per year m the Netherlands, with about one third of those actually occurring. That 1s, two thirds of the requests did not lead to an active ktllmg of the patient. The 3000 cases of active euthanasia a year came to 1.8% of all deaths m the Netherlands Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de note that m 40% of the Dutch cases, at least 1 of 3 safeguards were violated. It turned out that 84% of all Dutch I, 'I I:
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What would these numbers look like 1f extrapolated to the Umted States? Look around this room and 1magme that >80% of you would have discussed active euthanasia with your patients and >50% would have engaged m 1t at least once. There would be about 150,000 requests for active euthanasia a year, with 50,000 actual cases occurnng, and, 1f we were not any better than the Dutch at followmg the gmdelmes, there would be 20,000 violations of the proposed safeguards THOMAS W. MAYO. Obviously, the debate over phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia has moved out of medical school grand rounds and medical Journal settmgs and has become a matter of public debate, public leg1slat1on, and public controversy. The public d1mens1on of this debate has not always been respectful of the kmds of d1stmctions that Bob has carefully laid out this mornmg It has not always been the most well mformed of debates, but 1t has, nonetheless, certamly begun with some vigor, and 1s not about to get turned around or stopped. I will discuss the form m which some of these public developments have occurred m order to see where the law leaves us on this question m 1998
First, let us start with public opm1on. It 1s often said that two thirds of Amencans support phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de, and 1t 1s often said that two thirds of Amencans oppose phys1e1an-ass1sted smc1de It turns out that both of these propositions are correct It all depends on the question that 1s bemg asked and how the chmces are framed.
A more careful review of public opm1on pollmg data shows that roughly one third of Amencans are agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de, no matter how one descnbes 1t, and regardless of what kmds of safeguards are suggested by way of lim1tmg this type of euthanasia Another one third of Amencans are m favor of phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de as a general proposition and are really qmte supportive of 1t.
Then there 1s a fmal one third m the middle who are mostly agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de but who agree that 1t probably does have some role as a treatment option m certam extreme circumstances This middle group, dependmg on how the question gets phrased, flips to one side or the other of a yes-or-no chmce when the pollmg 1s done.
Let us examme where the states have come out legislatively with regard to these different types of euthanasia Both passive euthanasia and mdirect euthanasia ( the so-called "double-effect" death) are legal m all 50 states As long as basic respect for the patient's chmces 1s observed, termmatmg life-sustammg care to the pomt of termmal sedat10n does not raise a cnmmal or civil legal issue m any state Similarly, the Amencan Medical Assac1ation has been pretty mfluential m the public debate, has been very active m litigation at the US Supreme Court, and has lobbied state and federal legislators extensively The Amencan Medical Assoc1at1on's pos1t10n 1s that termmatmg life support and termmal sedation (or double-effect death) are consistent with its ethical canons.
Phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de, on the other hand, 1s illegal nght now m 48 states, all but Oregon, whose statute we will discuss later, and Massachusetts, which has no statute law on the subJect In addition to 48 states, the D1stnct of Columbia has banned phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de. The Amencan Medical Association has taken a posltlon consistently over the years that phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de 1s not permitted under its eth1eal canons S1m1-larly, at the far end of the spectrum, active euthanasia 1s also not permitted by the Amencan Medical Assoc1at10n's ethical gmdelines and would be considered some form of hom1e1de m all 50 states as thmgs currently stand. That 1s the background for what has become a very mterestmg legal battle m the courts over the status of proh1b1t10ns by the states agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted sme1de.
To grasp this debate fully, however, 1t 1s important to remember a couple of thmgs about lmgation m the US Supreme Court on these matters. The very first so-called nght-to-d1e case decided by the Supreme Court only m 1990 was the case of Cruzan vs Director, Missouri Department of Health (497 US 261 [1990] ). This case mvolved a young woman, Nancy Beth Cruzan, who, at the time of the commencement of litigat10n, had been m a persistent vegetative state for about 5 years. By the time the case went before the Supreme Court, she had been in a vegetative state for nearly 8 years She was m a state facility, and the physicians who worked at that facility opposed the request of her parents that tube feedmgs be d1scontmued.
In the state courts, Cruzan vs Director, Missouri Department of Health, ended up bemg litigated all the way to the M1ssoun Supreme Court. That court imposed a number of qmte severe limitations on the nght of parents or other surrogate dec1S1on-makers to choose to d1scontmue hfe-sustammg treatments m the cases of patients who are unable to speak and choose for themselves The limitations mvoked consisted of ev1dentiary and burden-of-proof rules. The court said that dec1s1on-makers had to show that patients themselves had md1cated that they preferred not to have aggressive hfe-sustammg treatment. Further, this proof had to be shown with clear and convmcmg evidence, the highest standard of e1v1l proof at tnal. M1ssoun 1s not the only state that has adopted this pos1t10n. New York, hke a number of other states, 1s m hne with M1ssoun
The rulmg of the M1ssoun Supreme Court raised a s1gmf1-cant issue: Were some types of severe hm1tat10ns perm1ss1ble on a patient's chmce (although, m this case, Nancy Beth Cruzan's parents-not the patient-were makmg the dec1S1on) or were these hm1tat10ns gomg too far m hm1tmg chmces at the end of hfe? This issue was litigated up to the US Supreme Court
The US Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the US Constitution prevents states from 1mposmg severe procedural ev1dentiary hm1tat1ons on family members' end-of-hfe chmces The Supreme Court ruled that there ts nothmg m the US Constitution that says states cannot impose these fairly extreme measures. It said that, although there may be some outer constitutional pnnciple that might come mto play m a different sort of case, passive euthanasia is pnmanly a matter of state law, and the states have an extremely free hand and very broad authonty to develop their own rules m this area In additton, m a senes of opmions m this case, the Court expressed an almost wistful desire for the mcreased use of advanced directives, i e., hvmg wills or durable powers of attorney for health care Had there been an advanced directive, Cruzan potentially would have been qmte a different case, and the failure to respect the advanced directive executed by the patient might well have raised a more acute constitut10nal question for the Court There is certamly a suggestton m the opmions of 8 of the 9 Justices that Cruzan could have come out the other way had there been a hvmg will or a durable power of attorney for health care Moreover, even on the issue of whether state law or federal law governs m this area, the Supreme Court decision was a 5 to 4 declSlon The Supreme Court was extremely spht even over this fairly straightforward propositton.
Just this last term, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the legahty of prohibitions agamst physician-assisted smcide m the cases of Washington vs Glucksburg ( 117 S. Ct 2303
[1997]),mWashmgtonState,andVaccovs Qwll(ll7S Ct 2293 [1997] ), m New York Tim Qmll, a named plamtiff m one of these cases, is one of the most articulate proponents of the position that physician-assisted smcide ought to be regarded as an ethical optton In both of these cases, groups of physicians and patients challenged state laws that prohibited physician-assisted smcide across the board In both of these cases, mtermediate federal appellate courts, the 9th Circmt and the 2nd C1rcmt, ruled that the prohibittons were unconstituttonal. This meant that, as a matter of either substantive due process under the 14th amendment or equal protection under the 14th amendment, prohibit10ns hke those m Washmgton and New York were unconstituttonal and had to fall.
The impact of these decisions was potentially qmte strong, because the 9th Circmt embraces 9 states, or the entire western part of the USA. The 2nd Circmt embraces New York, Connecticut, and Vermont When you add up the populations of these 2 ctrcmts, about one third of the population of the USA hves m states that are covered by the rulmgs of these 2 mtermediate appellate courts It looked as though all of the laws prohibitmg physician-assisted sutcide m these states, at least, were unconstitutional if these decisions were allowed to stand. Obviously, the Supreme Court would have some mterest m cleanng up the law m an area that would affect one third of the population of the USA So, the Court granted review m these cases and handed down its opmions last spnng
The ftrst part of their holdmg is probably the most important Just as it did m the Cruzan case, the Court said that states have a wide area of discretion to legislate m accordance with their view of pceferred public policy. This authonty mcludes the authonty to prohibit physician-assisted smcide, as Washmgton and New York have done and as Texas did about 2 decades ago. Consequently, the rulmg here is that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the US Constitution hmits state choice m this area, at least if the ch01ce is to prohibit physician-assisted smcide.
Other portions of the opmion are worth notmg. In one passage, the Supreme Court tned to draw a distmction between passive euthanasia and physician-assisted smcide The argument had been made that, given the mvolvement of medical personnel m producmg the death of a patient, physician-assisted smetde and passive euthanasia ought to be viewed as roughly the same thmg The Court said no, that really is not true as a matter of Amencan law. The Court used both causation and mtent to try to show this Fust, the mtent with passive euthanasia is to reheve suffenng, not pnmanly to produce the patient's death, although it may be understood with mdirect euthanasia or double-effect that death is a foreseeable but umntended side effect of palliative care The mtent, however, is to reheve suffermg only and not to achieve death as a means of domg that. In the Court's view, the causative agent with physician-assisted suicide is a lethal dose of painkiller, whereas the causative agent with indirect euthanasia or double effect is a therapeutic dose of painkiller that was carefully calibrated and delivered to the patient with the mtentton and design to reheve pam only but turned out to be a dose that was enough to produce the patient's death Agam, proponents of physician-assisted smcide see these distmctions as dancmg on the head of a pm rather than really makmg an important distmctton, but the Court, a number of the litigants before the Court, and many people m the Umted States see these distmctions as bemg absolutely crucial What is the status oflaw m Oregon? In 1994, Oregon passed the Death With Digmty Act that provided for physician assistance to the extent of wntmg a prescnptton for a dose of medication that will be used to end the patient's hfe. The voters, by about a 60% to 40% margm last November, reaffirmed their desire to have this statute on the books ( Oregon Revised Statutes, § § 127 800-.897 [1997] ). We have now seen the begmnmg of the implementation of that act m Oregon It is important, I thmk, to understand the safeguards that Oregon has tned to design mto this statute.
Fust, the most important limitation may well be that only competent patients, i.e., adult patients with decision-makmg \ capacity, may participate m this exchange with physicians Minors are excluded, as are any adult patients who lack decistonmakmg capacity.
Second, this act is limited to patients who have a termmal disease. Although termmal disease is not defmed any more precisely than it is under the Natural Death Act m Texas, it has to be determmed m accordance with reasonable medical Judgment, and it has to be certified by 2 physicians, specifically, the attendmg physician and a consultmg physician who has expertise m a relevant area of medicme Next, the patient's request has to be repeated over a fairly long penod of time and has to be repeated, not once, not twice, but 3 times There are 2 oral requests that the statute antteipates, as well as a wntten one. I will descnbe those m more detail.
Ftrst, there 1s a 15-day waitmg penod after the patient's ftrst oral request and before there can be a wntten request. Fifteen days is also the mmimum time between the first oral request and the second. This coolmg-off penod is mtended to give the pa-BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER PROCEEDINGS VOLUME 11, NUMBER 4 ttent, as well as family members and those who are providing care for the patient, an opportumty to work through what 1t ts that has moved the patient to make this request at this time. This request may be a call for help, an indication of the failure, so far, to deal with the pain that he or she 1s feeling, or an attempt to deal with the loss of d1gmty that he or she 1s expenencing. Furthermore, over these 15 days, tf there ts a way to try to meet some of these ob1ect10ns to the kmd of care the patient 1s receiving, obviously thts ts the time to do 1t. Second, there 1s a mtmmum 2-day waiting penod between the wntten request and the wntten prescnption So, the whole process ts intended to be slowed down by at least 1 7 days This ts not enough of a slowdown 1f one 1s an opponent of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutc1de. Actually, this 17-day cooling-off penod 1s a point of contention with some proponents of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutctde, as well, who think this wamng penod 1s really a demal of the due process nghts of patients.
The last couple of safeguards consist of the followmg: Physicians must ask tf they can notify the patient's nearest relatives of the chmce that ts being made If the patient says no, the phys1C1an may not deny the prescnptton to the patient on thts basis, but 1t at least has to be discussed. In add1t1on, before wnting the prescnptton, the physician must offer the patient the opportumty to rescmd the chmce. This must be exphctt and qmte affirmatively presented as an option
There also has to be a very detailed informed consent disclosure session with the patient The statute 1s qmte speC1fic and goes on for about a page, which ts much longer than most informed consent statutes. All of the things that need to be disclosed with the patient are descnbed, including alternatives to the use of the drug that the patient has requested, a detailed descnpt1on of what will happen 1f these drugs are taken in the prescnbed dose, and so forth. There 1s no blmkmg here m the statute about what ts bemg discussed and what 1s bemg done All of that has to be laid out with some care by the physician In add1t10n, tf the physician has a reasonable behef that the patient may be suffermg from some kmd of psychological or psych1atnc condmon, e.g., depression, 1t 1s mandatory for the physician to order a psychiatnc consult. There has to be some attempt at counseling the patient before the rest of the statute can be played out
We will see how long any of these safeguards actually survive over the next few years m the ht1g10us environment of Oregon Frankly, I thmk that there are qmte respectable due process and equal protection arguments that might be made agamst one or more of the safeguards that have been set out m the statute If that 1s the case, then obviously the class of patients potentially affected, as well as the class of physicians who will be brought mto this, will expand as these hm1tat1ons drop away.
Frequently over the years, I have heard Bob and a number of other folks on ethics committees around the ctty talk about choosmg the least bad death-deaths that are not that great no matter what choice ts made. Therefore, f1gurmg out what ts the least bad death, m terms of a patient's own system of values and goals for treatment, ts very often all we are left with for d1scus-s10n purposes It could well be argued that the policy chmce that ts bemg made now or that was made, 1f you will, by the Supreme Court last year, 1s a chmce among the least bad alternatives m dealmg with phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia My colleague Martha Mmow, who ts at the Harvard Law School, has recently wntten a review of the Supreme Court cases from last year that I have 1ust discussed (7) As she puts tt, there are really 2 big hes we have to choose between In this sense, these are the 2 least bad chmces that we are being asked to make The first of these hes ts that proh1b1t10n will effectively prevent the occurrence of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutc1de. The fact ts, even m a state where 1t 1s clearly a felony to engage m this act, as tt 1s in most of the states m this country, the polls published m JAMA and the New England Journal of Medicine, among other places, indicate that there ts considerably more acttvtty m this area than 1s normally publicly acknowledged. Proh1b1tion may chill people's enthusiasm for 1t, prohib1t10n may d1mm1sh the numbers who are wtllmg to engage m the activity, but 1t 1s pretty clear that proh1-b1t1on will not prevent phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de any more than proh1b1t1on statutes have ever prevented enttrely the act they address
The second he Professor Mmow alludes to m her article 1s the he that the legahzatton of phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de would not systematically and routinely be used to push dying people mto death. She 1s not talkmg necessanly about the "shppery slope" here I thmk what she 1s talkmg about ts that the legal1zat10n of phys1cian-ass1sted smctde many legal system, whether tt 1s the legal system of Texas, or Cahforma, or the USA as a whole, changes the terms and cond1t1ons of the care that ts provided at the end of hfe, and that affects everybody. She puts 1t this way: "Exits change what tt means to be here The nght to termmate treatment makes contmumg treatment a daily chmce The nght to termmate a pregnancy makes contmumg the pregnancy a deliberate act The nght to divorce makes mamtammg a marnage a matter of vohtton. The nght to the atd of a doctor m endmg one's hfe means that dymg patients will be mv1ted to thmk about tts exercise It means that family members will consider 1t. It means that hospitals and nursmg homes will mstituttonahze it. It means that popular culture will elaborate lt. It means that young and vibrant people will contemplate tt." Her pos1t10n 1s that the Supreme Court, although 1t did not articulate these 2 pos1t10ns as 2 hes to choose between, in fact, did choose one of these when tt said that proh1bmons agamst phys1cian-ass1sted smctde are constttuttonal. The pubhc pohcy chmce that we are lookmg at over the next 5 to 15 years m every state m the country wtll be which of these positions ts the least unappealmg to those who are m a pos1t1on to make the chmce DR. FINE: I want to wrap up with what, I hope, are some pragmatic truths about bemg on the spot with the dymg patient I am gomg to draw on a very mce article wntten by Dr. Andrew B1llmgs and Dr Susan Block ( 8) They outlme for us a comprehensive assessment of the dymg patient that takes in account not only the physical symptoms such as pain, nausea, weakness, and dyspnea, but also social, psychological, and spmtual factors Untreated pam 1s a common precursor to sutC1de attempts in our society. We know from the Dutch expenence that when pain was the reason why Dutch ctttzens were requestmg active euthanasia and 1t was effectively treated, the request for active euthana-sta was withdrawn. Unfortunately we have a long way to go The SUPPORT study in this country revealed that half of dymg patients expenence poorly treated pain near death (9) In my own expenence working as your ethics consultant here, I frequently fmd that patients and the1r families doubt our ab1hty to treat pam and other symptoms of dying They think that we cannot do 1t! Sometimes, this causes them to seek early termmation of treatment If we can reassure patients that their pam can be managed, that their symptoms can be taken care of, many will choose to contmue hfe-sustainmg treatment and have a chance to get better. I thmk 1t ts important that we reassure our patients of both the availability and our ability to treat then pain and other symptoms.
We also must assess and deal with the psychological issues of dymg, includmg gnef, depress10n, and anxiety. This 1s easter said than done Obviously, one of the biggest problems we face ts that many of the vegetative symptoms of depress10n-mala1se, fatigue, and so on-are the symptoms of innumerable termmal illnesses Sometimes the only way you, as a physician, are gomg to know 1f a patient ts suffermg with depression ts to consult with a psychiatnst or psychologist. Often, we must try empmc treatment with antidepressants to determme 1f the vegetative symptoms w1ll 1mprove.
Dealing with spmtual and values issues 1s also important The old adage that there are no atheists m foxholes rmgs true for dymg patients as well. Amencan society ts a religious sooety Consider askmg the FICA questions of your patients Do you have a rehg1ous or spmtualfarth? What is the involvement of that faith in your life 7 Do you have a religious or spmtual community 7 How do you want to me to address your religious or sptntual concerns? Only by askmg these questions do you have a chance to deal with them. Your patients and then families will often gmde you through this process m their spmtual hfe 1f you give them a chance At Baylor Umvers1ty Medical Center, we are fortunate to have the additional expertise of skilled hospital chaplams.
Frequently, we must assess and deal with difficulties m interpersonal relationships. As health care professionals, we are all fam1har with dysfunct10nal families, and the dysfunctional may only get worse m the face of termmal illness Termmal illnesses sometimes brmg out the best within fam1hes, but they also may bring out some pretty unusual and difficult copmg mechamsms withm families. We need to recogmze these and try to deal with them as best as we can. Agam, I thmk this is where a multid1soplmary team approach comes m, with soCLal workers and chaplams becoming important adjuncts to the overall treatment effort Fmally, I would hke for you to reflect with me on the nature of the phys1c1an-pat1ent relationship. The Jewish philosopher Martm Buber suggests to us m his most famous work, I and Thou, that there are 2 fundamental relat10nsh1ps (10). One is the "I-it" relat1onsh1p. When we see patients in an l-1t relationship, we come to view them as 1ust ob1ects to be mampulated m the environment. When we talk man l-1t relanonsh1p, we often go back to those techmcal questions that are drummed mto our heads m trammg, and the conversation often is somethmg hke, "Can you tell me what the potassmm, the blood gas, and the complete blood count are on the pneumoma m bed 12 7 " The mformation ts necessary, but it is not sufficient for the best management of the dymg patient This conversat10n reflects the loss of the umque humamty of the person with pneumoma Buber suggests that a more appropnate relationship ts an"!-thou" relationship It is a relationship of coequals based upon mutual respect, mutual trust, and even mutual need. I thmk that m order to create an I-thou relationship m the chmcal settmg of the dymg patient, the physician has to be w1llmg to have a different kmd of conversation that, I am afraid, does not happen as often as it should. Often, when I go m the role of ethics consultant m an effort to work through some perceived problem or cnsis around a dymg patient, one of the quest10ns that I will ask the patient is somethmg along the lmes of, "I know it's d1ff1-cult to talk about this, but would you hke to talk about the senousness of your illness and even the possibility of death 7 patients say yes Almost mev1tably, the response I get from patients is, "Why, Dr. Fme, nobody has ever asked me that before." This md1cates to me that none of the doctors and none of the nurses have asked the patient that before. I will ask 1f 1t bothers him or her that I have asked. Almost all welcome the discussion, which then leads to quest10ns such as, "Where do you want to be when you die?", "Who should be there?",,or "In your worst moments, have you wLShed your death might come sooner 7 " This begms to open up the relat1onsh1p with the patient and moves it beyond the l-1t techmcal necessmes (e g, knowmg the potassmm, the blood gas, and the complete blood count). The relationship becomes a more spmtual and lovmg I-thou that 1s essential to the highest quality ofhealmgl Remember that there is more than one type of healing. When we finally accept that death 1s not our worst enemy, we can begm to see death as a healmg of sorts Death 1s, after all, mevitable and inescapable.
On that note, I want to end with a httle tale that Victor Frankl wrote of in Man's Search for Meaning (11) . VICtor Frankl recalled a Persian folk tale involving a wealthy man and his servant They are walking through the garden of the wealthy man, and the servant is walkmg ahead Suddenly, the servant comes upon the figure of Death. Startled and fnghtened out of his wits, the servant turns and runs as fast as he can the other way and gets back to his master. He says, "Master, I have Just seen Death m the garden, and he has come to take me. Please, I have been such a faithful servant, may I have your fastest horse so that I might escape and run away 7 " The master says, "Certainly you may. Take my fastest horse and flee to Teheran at once." And so the servant does. The master contmues walking through the garden, and he, too, comes upon Death, but, bemg a very brave man and, frankly, a httle bit angry at this point, he looks Death nght in the eye He confronts Death, and he says, "Death, why did you scare away my trusted and loyal servant? He has done
